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ABSTRACT This essay explores the kind of cultural and ideological work effected by the
concept of dementia in contemporary popular culture in the global north through a critical
reading of three ‘genre’ texts: Renny Harlin’s action movie meets sci-ﬁ, Deep Blue Sea (1999),
Vernor Vinge’s speculative ﬁction Rainbows End (2007) and Rupert Wyatt’s sci-ﬁ drama, Rise
of the Planet of the Apes (2011), all of which engage with the possibility of neural regeneration
and a cure for dementia. Dominant epistemologies of dementia and ageing often focus on the
potentially unsustainable social and economic burden presented by an ageing population and
the obligation to meet the needs of older people living with impairments. Exploring the
articulation of these economic and political arguments alongside an analysis of the promis-
sory discourses of bio-gerontology and neuroscience, this essay considers the ways in which
dementia has emerged as an over-determined point of tangency upon which particular ideas
about ageing, mortality, human value, sustainability and futurity are played out. The analysis
of the cultural texts presented here exposes the limits of market and individual oriented
responses to dementia and ageing within the broader context of what Nick Srnicek and Alex
Williams have described as the ‘emerging crisis of work and surplus populations’. This paper
argues that an exploration of the ideological fault-lines, imaginary resolutions and forms of
wish fulﬁlment that emerge in the ﬁlms and novel, enable us to identify the ideological
limitations of the neoliberal discourses that circumscribe the ways in which we currently
understand dementia and our imaginative investments in the promise of its cure.
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Introduction
At the centre of this essay is an argument about the kind ofcultural and ideological work effected by the concept ofdementia in contemporary popular culture in the global
north. Without diminishing the challenges that living with
dementia presents nor the importance of neuroscientiﬁc and
medical research in this ﬁeld, my focus here is on the ways in
which the contemporary meanings of this complex syndrome
(George et al., 2011) emerge at the intersection of science, politics,
economics, bioethics and culture. This is to foreground the ways
in which dementia operates as an ideologically freighted category,
utilised and put to work to further particular political and ethical
debates as much as it describes a set of pathological processes, a
range of symptoms and a lived, embodied experience. (Burke,
2015, pp 9–10)
In what follows, I explore the role played by current epis-
temologies of dementia in relation to ideas about life extension,
regeneration and sustainability and the economic and ideolo-
gical frameworks that underpin them. As Céline Lafontaine
argues, in contemporary cultural discourse ageing has become a
‘crisis’ that “cannot be separated from the emergence of a
bioeconomy based on the pharmaceutical industry, genetic
engineering and the development of biomedical research as a
whole”(Lafontaine, 2009, p 56). As a condition that tests the
limits of current biomedical research, dementia plays a crucial
role in the attribution of ageing as an intractable social and
economic problem particularly for the economies of the global
north. It is its role as an over-determined point of tangency
upon which particular ideas about ageing, regeneration, human
value, sustainability and futurity are played out that interests me
here.
There are only a few literary and cinematic texts that explicitly
address the possibilities of neural regeneration or cure in rela-
tion to the kind of cognitive impairment associated with
dementia.1 However, I would argue that these texts illuminate
the ideological limitations of the dominant paradigms through
which we currently know, understand and approach the chal-
lenges with which dementia as a predominantly age-related
condition presents us. This essay addresses these issues through
a critical comparison of three popular cultural ‘genre’ texts:
Renny Harlin’s action movie meets sci-ﬁ, Deep Blue Sea (Harlin,
1999), Vernor Vinge’s speculative ﬁction Rainbows End (Vinge,
2007) and Rupert Wyatt’s Rise of the Planet of the Apes (Wyatt,
2011).
Hollywood blockbusters and popular science ﬁction, like all
cultural practices, are born out of determinate historical situa-
tions. From a materialist standpoint, such cultural productions
are both shaped by, and attempts to shape or resolve the his-
torical questions with which they engage. These imaginary or
cultural ‘resolutions’ to real social problems (Jameson, 2013)
operate not just in the raw historical material or content of the
ﬁlm but also in the narrative structure, stylistic innovations and
cultural form of any given text. My reading of these texts draws
attention to ideological “faultlines” (Sinﬁeld, 1992) that cannot
be directly expressed in some of the most culturally powerful
and ideologically persuasive articulations of dementia, ageing
and biological regeneration. Read against the grain, these ﬁc-
tional narratives reveal the systemic violence, contradictions
and pressures that underpin the kind of economic and political
arguments that ask us to imagine that a future without dementia
is the answer to the social and economic challenges presented
by an ageing population. However, before I progress to an
analysis of these texts, I ﬁrst want to provide some more
context regarding the historical developments to which they
respond.
Ageing as the enemy within: dementia and the biomedical
imaginary today
Writing in the context of the medicalisation of dementia in the
twentieth century, Sharon Kaufman describes Alzheimer’s as a
“modern form of life itself” and details the capacity of diagnosis
and the medical apparatus to transform “living beings” into vic-
tims, patients, and research subjects with a degenerative brain
disease (Kaufman, 2006, pp 24–25). As many scholars have noted,
dementia emerges into public discourse in the late twentieth
century as an imminent crisis of epidemic proportions, the site
upon which new bodies and subjects are materialised and upon
which ethical debates around care, personhood and the value of
some lives over others are harnessed and played out. (See, for
example, Fleischer, 1999; Kitwood, 1989; Kitwood, 1990; Leibing
and Cohen, 2006; Shakespeare et al., 2017; Singer, 1996). Kauf-
man identiﬁes the dementia victim, patient and research subject
but we can also add the dementia expert, the dementia activist,
the ‘dementia friend’ along with the panoply of private enter-
prises, third sector, cultural and community organisations that
have emerged in the wake of the so-called “Alzheimer’s epidemic”
(Lin and Lewis, 2015).
The biomedicalisation of dementia occurs in tandem with a
powerful imaginative investment in the potential of scientiﬁc
research to enable us to defeat age-related illnesses and even, for
some, to evade age-related mortality. This is manifest both in the
biologisation of age-related conditions such as dementia and also
in the biologisation of ageing itself as witnessed in the emergence
of the sub-disciplinary ﬁelds of theoretical, molecular, bio-
gerontology and cyto-gerontology (Kirkwood, 2002; Kirkwood,
2005; Kirkwood and Cremer, 1982; Moreira and Palladino, 2009).
One of the major and rather controversial examples of this type of
development is Aubrey D.N.J.de Grey’s proposed ‘strategies for
engineered negligible senescence’ (SENS). De Grey’s ultimate aim
with SENS is to extend life indeﬁnitely (Grey et al., 2002) on the
basis of the potential of telomerase, allotropic mitochondrial-
coded proteins and marker-tagged toxins to combat the “damage”
and “junk” of the aging process (Zealley and De Grey, 2013). The
reconﬁguration of ageing (Moreira and Palladino, 2008) as a
complex biological process that biomedical research will ulti-
mately enable us to resist is, as Melinda Cooper has argued,
sustained by the promises of stem-cell research and the identiﬁ-
cation of cell lines with the capacity “to reproduce themselves
indeﬁnitely” (Cooper, 2011, p 129). As the bio-gerontologist Tom
Kirkwood notes, “to understand the cell and molecular basis of
aging is to unravel the multiplicity of mechanisms causing
damage to accumulate and the complex array of systems working
to keep damage at bay” (Kirkwood, 2005, p 437).
Many scientists such as Kirkwood caution against the claim
that current scientiﬁc research has the potential to defeat age-
related mortality (Moreira and Palladino, 2008; Warner et al.,
2005). For instance, de Grey’s aim to extend life indeﬁnitely
through ‘strategies for engineered negligible senescence’ has been
described by a group of bio-gerontologists (including Kirkwood)
as “so far from plausible that it commands no respect at all within
the scientiﬁc community” (Warner et al., 2005, p 1006). However,
at the level of popular culture, the growing traction of research on
life extension points to “a new social conﬁguration whereby the
avoidance of ageing and the pursuit of immortality are becoming
normatively binding” (Moreira and Palladino, 2008, p 22). This
conﬁguration is exempliﬁed by the proliferation of crowd-funded
biotechs, non-proﬁt organisations and foundations such as The
Methusalah (Methuselah Foundation) and also de Grey’s SENS
Research Foundation (Sens Research Foundation: reimagine
aging). All of the above organisations invest, largely uncritically
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both ﬁnancially and ideologically, in the potential of scientiﬁc
research to prevent and forestall the genetic, environmental and
cellular processes that characterise ageing and which contribute to
the age-related conditions that cause the majority of our deaths.
For example, the ELPIs Foundation for Indeﬁnite Lifespans
describes its mission “to research, discuss and describe strategies
that may lead to the abolition of age-related degeneration and
involuntary death due to ageing” (The ELPIs Foundation for
Indeﬁnite Lifespans) and The Brain Preservation Foundation
argues for brain preservation research and technologies on the
basis that we may soon be able to revivify our minds and
memories:
… with the ever quickening pace of science and technology
more of us are realising that death will not be a part of the
human condition forever. Our great-grandchildren may not
know traditional death at all; ours may be one of the very
last generations to cower under its looming shadow. The
perfection of brain preservation technology represents
today’s best chance at reaching that future world. (The
Brain Preservation Foundation, 2017)
These online organisations typically combine extracts from
scientiﬁc papers with optimistic extrapolations of recent research
and invitations to donate to and support their endeavours to
defeat senescence. “Aging is an enemy”, the Fight Aging website
tells us, “So ﬁght it!” (Fight Aging!, 2017). This kind of popular
iteration of bio-gerontology is an essentially promissory dis-
course, the realisation of which is presented as wholly contingent
upon our investment in the promise and in the belief that sci-
entiﬁc research alone will enable us to reinvent ourselves and
embrace an indeﬁnite future. However, it is important to
underline the extent to which the force and dynamism of this
promise operates primarily at the level of the imagination. It
engages us at an affective level rather than primarily rational level
and thus cannot be contained or dismissed purely with reference
to scientiﬁc epistemologies. Its status as fantastical or implausible
nonsense has little bearing on its force and appeal. Indeed, it is
precisely the appropriation of this appeal as the motivation for
the investment of ﬁnancial and intellectual capital that serves as a
central component in the conﬁdent predictions of ﬁgures such as
de Grey as to the successful realisation of the dream of biological
regeneration. De Grey’s approach to criticism of his scientiﬁc
claims is essentially to present his detractors as suffering from
both a failure of will and imagination (Grey, 2006a, b).
As this indicates, the biomedicalisation of both dementia and
ageing has a number of consequences, not least in opening up the
possibility that a condition that was previously associated with
ageing might be cured, that neurological damage might be
reversed and that neural cells might be regenerated. This possi-
bility is precariously reinforced by the increasing attention in the
scientiﬁc community to modiﬁable life style factors and risk
prevention in relation to dementia (Kivipelto et al., 2005; Kivi-
pelto et al., 2013; Ritchie et al., 2010). However, it is important to
note that the reporting of this research in the media consistently
elides the distinctions between the different illnesses that cause
dementia. This serves to constitute what is in reality a complex
and unknowable syndrome as a distinct and singular entity thus
blurring the distinctions between mild and major cognitive dis-
orders, vascular dementia and Alzheimer’s and so on (George
et al., 2011). The failure to differentiate between conditions for
which preventative action may be possible, and those for which it
is not, produces a set of pressures on the individual peculiar to
contemporary global capitalism. The assertion of individual
responsibility alongside the essential powerlessness of the indi-
vidual to prevent certain dementias arguably reproduces the kind
of modulation between hope and hopelessness, panic and the
possibility of taking control that characterises the risk/security
nexus that structures contemporary cultural responses to a range
of threats from terrorism and paedophilia, to political justiﬁca-
tions of austerity (Agamben and Emcke, 2001; Furedi, 2006). In
other words, the notion that we must take action to protect
ourselves, modify our behaviour, maintain constant vigilance and
simultaneously manage our own anxiety levels about the con-
sequences of ageing itself operates as a regulatory or disciplinary
mechanism the effectivity of which arguably rests on its inher-
ently contradictory quality. Its power lies in the impossible
injunction to control the uncontrollable or to take responsibility
for an unknowable, contingent future.
Dementia now! Ideologies of crisis and disaster in the era of
late capitalism
At a political and governmental level, the biomedicalisation of
dementia has facilitated an increasingly catastrophizing discourse.
This posits the projected societal and economic costs of dementia
care as an unmanageable and unsustainable burden intrinsic to
the nature of the condition itself rather than to the ways in which
we might manage care, organise our lives, conceive of our com-
munitarian responsibilities to each other or even embrace the
possibility of living and dying well with an impairment. The
ubiquitous use of the language of natural disaster in stock phrases
such as the “silver tsunami” or ﬁguration of dementia as a ram-
pant epidemic reinforce the alignment of a particular way of
thinking about dementia with the natural world (Peel, 2014;
Zeilig, 2013). This kind of rhetoric that insistently naturalises the
notion of crisis suggests that our experience of dementia can
somehow be abstracted from history and from the epistemolo-
gical frameworks and ideological and political pressures that
produce it as a particular kind of problem at a particular historical
conjuncture. Reframed in the language of ecological crisis,
dementia is posited as a condition whose effects and impact are
socially and economically unsustainable. In a discourse that
mirrors debates around limited natural resource and environ-
mental crisis, the corollary of this type of approach is that it is
becoming increasingly difﬁcult to untether dementia as an age-
related condition from broader questions of resource and eco-
nomic sustainability. It is interesting to note, however, that whilst
dementia and ageing are subjected to this kind of economic
evaluation on the grounds of the societal threat they apparently
pose, neoliberal responses to climate change are characterised by
a reluctance to intervene or acknowledge the role of unregulated
consumer capitalism in environmental destruction (Monbiot,
2016).
As Jérôme Pélissier has argued many socio-economic studies
posit ageing as a contributory factor in economic stagnation and
regression (Pellissier, 2007). Underpinned by a narrowly deﬁned
conception of human value as the capacity to contribute to the
production of surplus value through wage labour and con-
sumerism, this view of ageing and more particularly of ageing
with an impairment as essentially unproductive, burdensome and
therefore value-less saturates popular cultural discourses. It is not
incidental that the presentation of dementia as a catastrophic
crisis in waiting has intensiﬁed since the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008 in
tandem with the rhetoric of austerity deployed to justify the
dismantling of the welfare state and the reduction of illness and
disability to questions of cost, burden and economic
sustainability.
We can certainly see a correlation between ageing and
impairment in later life and economic burden in the rhetoric of
the anti-ageing movement and the online biosocial (Rabinow,
2007) activism of groups such as Fight Aging! In a section of their
website entitled ‘What are the costs and consequences of aging?,
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the focus is explicitly on the costs and consequences for economic
productivity:
The overwhelming majority of all medical expenditure goes
towards treating the consequences of aging or providing
palliative care for the aged. Further, there is an enormous
opportunity cost to aging: those who become frail and
unable to work might have otherwise gone on to continue
earning and creating value. The amounts involved are
staggering: the cost of the most common chronic medical
conditions in the US amounts to $280 billion in
expenditures and $1 trillion in lost productivity each and
every year. The overwhelming majority of that is due to
aging. (Fight Aging!, 2017)
For the main part, the rhetoric of Fight Aging! interpellates its
website visitors as individuals motivated by a personal investment
in life extension taking the obviousness of immortality as a life
goal as read. The website includes reminders of the importance of
“regular exercise and the practice of calorie restriction with
optimal nutrition.” These reminders combine the familiar late
capitalist emphasis on individual responsibility for health and
wellbeing (Ayo, 2012; Galvin, 2002) with the idea that ageing and
impairment are intolerable outrages that it is within the scope of
medical research to eradicate because ‘we’ do not want to get old
or to become frail and dependent. Crucially, at the heart of all this
is an invitation literally to buy into the ﬁght against ageing and to
donate to de Grey’s SENS Research Foundation as “no other
organisation is doing as much to ensure that rejuvenation
therapies will be developed” (Fight Aging!, 2017).
This kind of approach is entirely continuous with the broader
privileging of the morally responsible, independent and implicitly
able-bodied individual in neoliberal concepts of citizenship
(Harvey, 2007; Turner, 2008, p 152). Highly critical of the reg-
ulatory powers of the US Food and Drug Administration, Fight
Aging! pursues a small state, low regulation agenda as the best
way to develop, trial and make available anti-ageing interventions.
The ostensibly socially, culturally and economically abstracted
human subject of anti-ageing research thus returns our gaze in
the form of the afﬂuent, informed and self-interested US citizen.
There is no mention of the geopolitical, social or ethical impli-
cations of the endeavour to ﬁght ageing. Nor is there any
engagement with the broader economic context in which this
research emerges, speciﬁcally in relation to the emergence of an
ever-expanding and increasingly precarious surplus population,
displaced from traditional jobs by globalisation, automation and
A.I (Davis, 2006; Dyer-Witheford, 2010; Gabbard, 2008; Srnicek
and Williams, 2015). Instead, there is an injunction to invest in a
range of private initiatives in order to realise a dream of biological
regeneration that is only conceivable for the wealthy.
In a sense, what we can begin to identify here is a particular
and potentially constitutive contradiction at the heart of this
enmeshing of anti-aging initiatives and investments in research to
cure dementia with governmental and economic imperatives.
Dementia re-cast as an epidemic or generational threat becomes a
site of condensation wherein some of the key paradoxes of the
current commodiﬁcation of social life, or even life itself, are
played out. Thus the invocation of a dementia as the locus of an
imminent and catastrophic threat also sets the scene for a series of
market interventions or speculative investment opportunities in
anti-aging research. The threat of economic collapse predicated
on the notion of the provision of care for older people with
dementia as an unsustainable burden simultaneously serves to re-
awaken the life powers of the non-human in the structure and
logic of capital. To invoke the suggestive words of thinkers as
diverse as Naomi Klein (Klein, 2007) and Slavoj Žižek (Žižek,
2010), the imagination and discourses of disaster, epidemic, crisis,
or even apocalyptic end times become a space within which the
logic of capital can paradoxically re-imagine and re-enthuse the
circuits of production and the endless re-valorisation of surplus
value. In the case of the “Alzheimer’s epidemic”, the assertion of
imminent disaster serves as the rationale for the kind of ‘crisis
exploitation’ that Klein describes as the ‘shock doctrine’ which is,
for her, the ideological modus operandi of neoliberalism. Per-
sistently described as catastrophic threat and unsustainable bur-
den, dominant cultural representations of dementia associate the
condition with the worse kind of aging (vulnerable, dependent,
fragile) and present it as the greatest potential drain on economic
and emotional resources.
It is in this context that imagining a future without dementia
holds such an affective sway in the cultural and political ima-
ginary and in which I want to explore the ideological implications
and imaginative renderings of the promise of ‘neural regenera-
tion’ and an Alzheimer’s cure in two Hollywood blockbusters and
one work of speculative ﬁction. One of my key concerns in what
follows is to highlight the way in which the contradictions and
silences in the following texts enable us to envision a critique of
certain market-led assumptions about dementia and ageing and
to address the limits of these ways of thinking about and evalu-
ating life.
“Deep blue sea is about giant sharks eating people”
Renny Harlin’s ﬁlm Deep Blue Sea (1999) was released on the
cusp of the millennium and at the beginning of a period char-
acterised by increasingly apocalyptic projections of an imminent
‘dementia crisis’ in the global north (Jeste et al., 1999; Macdonald
and Cooper, 2006; Nathan, 2000). The ﬁlm imagines the con-
sequences of a scientist’s endeavour to ﬁnd a cure for Alzheimer’s
disease and in many respects exempliﬁes what Fredric Jameson
terms the “repetitive volatilisation” of mass culture (Jameson,
1979, p 27). A less than subtle combination of familiar texts, types
and tropes, an eminently predictable disaster movie narrative is
played out via the reworking of elements of Frankenstein (Shelley,
2014) and Spielberg (1975) and with passing visual references to
the submarines of Jules Verne and the mothership in Scott
(1979). As one of the blameless yet doomed characters presciently
notes “living below is like living in space, you don’t get room for
mistakes”. The narrative is also punctuated with stock comedic
interludes provided by LL Cool J’s Preacher, the cook at the deep-
sea research facility, Aquatica, at which all but two short scenes of
the ﬁlm are located. As Ian Nathan noted in his review in Empire
(2000), the ﬁlm offers “a dynamic, often thrilling mix of dumb-
arse horror-disaster movie staples and borderline parody”
(Nathan, 2000).
The story unfolds over a weekend at the research facility in
which the beautiful if emotionally contained English scientist Dr.
Susan McAlester (played by Saffron Burrows) ﬁnally achieves her
ambition to re-awaken Alzheimer’s damaged neurons from what
we later learn to be the genetically enhanced brains cells harvested
from a ‘super shark’. McAlester is driven to conduct this research
having personal experience of losing her father to Alzheimer’s
disease. She conducts her experiment in the company of the CEO
of Chimera Pharmaceuticals, Russell Franklin (Samuel L Jackson,
who it later transpires cannibalised two of the seven survivors of a
plane crash in the alps), her research team, Jim Whitlock, Tom
Scoggins and Janice Higgins, and the muscular (and heroic) all-
American-shark-wrangler-with-a-past, Carter Blake. Con-
veniently for the narrative at least, all other employees bar the
instantly expendable Brenda Kerns in the communication tower,
leave the facility for the weekend, thus avoiding the sudden and
unexpected storm one would logically expect to follow an act of
scientiﬁc hubris and the super shark revenge that ensues. At the
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end of the ﬁlm only two of the eight main characters, Preacher
and Carter, remain. Susan McAlester sacriﬁces herself to save
both them and the wider world by using herself as bait to prevent
the shark from making its escape into the deep blue sea.
McAlester’s successful reinvigoration of cells damaged by
Alzheimer’s directly recalls the spark of electricity that re-
animates the stitched together body parts of Frankenstein’s
monster. “What you are looking for here” she notes, “is lightening
in a bottle. Neurons are becoming hyper osmotic. They are ﬁr-
ing”. However, unlike Shelley’s story, the cosmological revenge
meted out as a consequence of McAlester’s act of Promethean
arrogance is articulated with a Christian, mid-western and anti-
intellectual sensibility. In contrast to the ﬁlm’s other key inter-text
Jaws, in which the geeky technocratic scientist survives alongside
the police, thus allegorising what Jameson describes as “an alli-
ance between the forces of law and order and the new technoc-
racy of the multinational corporations” (Jameson, 1979, p 144), in
Deep Blue Sea, the only characters that remain are the comedic
ﬁgure Preacher (who uses his cruciﬁx as a dagger when he is
attacked by the shark) and Carter whose sparse and blunt con-
versation is aligned with his physical strength and bravery.
In this respect, the ﬁlm’s crude morality tale about the dangers
of neuroscientiﬁc research and genetic modiﬁcation is articulated
alongside a deeply conservative notion of America that ultimately
plays out as a form of paralysis or temporal arrest. The ﬁlm
allegorises the eradication of the forces of capitalist speculation
(in the form of Russell Franklin, millionaire CEO and cannibal of
the vulnerable), of scientiﬁc research (destroyed by the elemental
forces of ﬁre and water), and of the scientists themselves. Even the
tentative romance between Carter and McAlester is sacriﬁced in
the name of male friendship and the expunging of the assertive,
female intellectual (who ﬁnally learns the error of her ways and
does everyone a favour by being consumed by her monstrous
progeny). In this sense, the story plays out the systematic erasure
of its original conditions of existence—the sharks, the science, the
scientists, the project and the facility are all destroyed in the end
as if they had never been. We are thus left in a deracinated, de-
historicised present. The two, now unemployed, men lie on what
remains of the research facility in the middle of an empty ocean.
The cost of survival is unemployment and the absence of an
imaginable future (the possibility of which may have been
afforded symbolically by the realisation of the romance between
McAlester and Carter). What begins as a ﬁlm about neural
regeneration thus concludes with an image of the redundant and
non-productive; the two survivors exchange greetings with a
boatful of relief workers returning to a job that no longer exists in
a decimated location.
We can perhaps identify here an ironic reworking of the his-
torical narrative of the displacement of human labour as a con-
sequence of technological advance. As this suggests, the ﬁlm is
ultimately unable to imagine neural regeneration or an Alzhei-
mer’s cure. This is something that falls outside of the ethical,
political and aesthetic frames with which it works. However, what
is important is that the kind of Bible-belt, mid-American con-
servative pleasures that are attached to the eradication of science
and the overcoming of the Leviathan are articulated with an
assertion of historical crisis in which the working community on
Aquatica is left without women or work, or any means to
reproduce itself. In a sense then, the ﬁlm intimates that the real
problem with regeneration resides in its relation to economic
production and productivity.
The ﬁlm here is remarkably prescient in its imagining of the
conjoined crises of work and surplus humanity that currently
beset us. In some senses, the trajectory of the narrative allegorises
the kind of historical trajectory that Thomas Frank explores in
What’s the Matter with Kansas (Frank, 2007) in which blue collar
workers paradoxically collude with the destructive forces of
capitalism that are destroying their own life chances and com-
munities. However, in its envisioning of the triumph of this kind
of conservative yet ultimately self-sabotaging sensibility, the ﬁlm
presents us with a question that is implied but never addressed in
all the calls for an Alzheimer’s cure: if we are not to die of cancer
or heart disease or dementia, how are we to die and how are we to
live as older people in our ageing bodies? And if we are to imagine
a future in which we evade ageing and impairment, how are we to
sustain ourselves in a world in which the very technology that
facilitates our longevity is bound up with the forms of automation
and artiﬁcial intelligence that underpin the current crisis of work
and which are implicated in the projected crisis of care as an
insuperable social and economic burden? As Nick Srnicek and
Alex Williams argue in Inventing the Future, the replacement of
human labour with automation and artiﬁcial intelligence means
that ‘the future isn’t working’ quite literally because of the era-
dication of traditional jobs and forms of wage labour (Srnicek and
Williams, 2015). This raises the question of how we are going to
live and care for each other in a world in which ever growing
numbers of people—not simply older people or those with
dementia—are rendered economically redundant.
The future isn't working?
As I noted above, the emphasis in both current political rhetoric
and the kind bio-gerontological activism promoted by Fight
Aging! is on the necessity to cure age-related conditions such as
dementia in order to increase productivity, address economic
stagnation and ameliorate the burden of social care and health
costs. However, what this cannot address are the broader impli-
cations of a future in which vast swathes of people (not simply
older people living with impairments) will be rendered ‘eco-
nomically unproductive’ as a structural consequence of the his-
torical development of capitalism and the need to extract
maximum surplus value for the lowest labour costs by replacing
humans with machines. The kind of systemic transformation
necessary to address the challenges of increasing longevity and
the crises of work and sustainability for populations as a whole
arguably requires a paradigmatic shift in the ways in which we
organise our lives, our ways of working and the structures and
practices of care.
If Deep Blue Sea ultimately resists the promises of regenerative
medicine, albeit from the kind of conservative, anti-intellectual
perspective currently lauded by Donald Trump, Vernor Vinge’s
speculative novel, Rainbows End (2007) foregrounds the difﬁ-
culties we encounter in the imagination of a fully realised social
totality in which dementia can be cured. Set in 2025 in San Diego
California, it describes a very different world to that of the
research facility in Deep Blue Sea. The world of the novel is one in
which digital technology and artiﬁcial intelligence permeate every
space and expression of human sociality and in which reality is
augmented by virtual overlays manipulated by wearable interfaces
and accessed via contact lenses with advanced retinal displays.
The environment is subject to constant modiﬁcation and varia-
tion, connectivity is virtual and both within and without the
narrative, this gives rise to a constitutive ontological uncertainty
as to the nature, material reality and motivation of particular
characters. Thus, for example, the integrity of the grad student
Zulﬁkar Sharif is violated by a computer virus and his avatar is
alternately inhabited by a young girl, Miri, and the ‘mysterious
stranger’ whose enigmatic presence and identity remains a con-
undrum throughout. One of the central protagonists of the novel,
poet Robert Gu, is cured of his late stage Alzheimer’s disease by
the medical facility at University of California at San Francisco
and rapidly restored to full health, although this comes at the
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price of the loss of his skills as a poet and like other older people
in the novel, he is initially unable to access or utilise the tech-
nology around him. The plot unfolds around Robert’s return to
high school and his embroilment in a complex plot involving
military intelligence and the mysterious, omniscient stranger who
communicates with Robert via Zulﬁkar Sharif and an avatar in
the form of a playful anthropomorphic rabbit.
Vinge’s novel is replete with references to gaming interfaces,
software and hardware, platforms and virtual reality but what the
novel appears unable to imagine is either history or “work” in the
sense of material reproduction. Technology is described and cures
are posited but without explanation as to their provenance or
development. For instance, in contrast to the quasi-scientiﬁc and
mechanistic explanations of cellular regeneration in Deep Blue
Sea, in Rainbow’s End there is no real endeavour to describe the
processes that underpin Robert’s cure; neither the provenance of
the cure in particular branches of medicine nor the mechanisms
by which it works are explored. Previously recumbent cells are
simply turned ‘on’. As Robert’s virtual health care provider notes:
Today we did your eyes. In a week or so we’ll start
reinforcing your peripheral nervous system.” Reed laughed.
“You know you’ve even got the skin and fat biochemistry
that responds to Venn-Kurasawa treatments. (p 27)
However, most signiﬁcantly, this is a world in which the forces
of production are entirely elided. We encounter the security
apparatus, virtual medical practitioners and educators and there
are references to advertising executives, but there are no refer-
ences to other forms of work or to productive labour. For
instance, there are no references to the practices which enable the
reproduction and circulation of technology or indeed the repro-
duction and circulation of food or material goods—the wearable
technology, the furniture on which people sit and so on. We thus
have ‘ideological reproduction’ cut loose from material produc-
tion. This occlusion of labour is redolent of the effacement of the
human and ecological damage wreaked in the production of the
sleek, minimalist smart phone. The world that Vinge imagines is
predicated on the abstraction of the potential of technology from
its capitalist mediation and thus from the question of its impact
upon the mass of humanity and the environment itself. There is
no space in the text for an exploration of the broader implications
of the longevity that technology facilitates.
In many ways, Vinge’s novel encapsulates the problem, as
Jameson puts it, of imagining the future as anything but “a
monotonous repetition of what is already here” (Jameson, 2003, p
65). Rainbows End does not envisage a radically new world but
the world in which the forces of capitalism have simply further
inﬁltrated every sphere of life and in which a handful of silicon
valley corporations continue to dominate human interaction.
There is in this respect, no ‘future’ but simply the continuation of
the ‘self-same’. Regeneration in this context, is not aligned with
the new or the transformative, but with the kind of chronic mode
discussed by Eric Cazdyn, “a mode of time that cares little for
terminality or acuteness but more for an undying present” and in
which “the maintenance of the status quo becomes, if not quite
our ultimate goal, what we will settle for” (Cazdyn, 2012, p 5).
What my reading of the ‘non said’ or silences in the novel sug-
gests then, is that this chronic mode precludes the development of
a critical understanding the implications of regeneration in rela-
tion to human longevity and its impact upon productivity and
modes of living and working. Despite being enmeshed with the
logic of late capitalism in Vinge’s text, this logic does not allow us
even to articulate the social and economic impact of an ageing
population; it simply passes over this question in silence. It is
worth noting here that despite the contortions and complexities
of the plot itself, in the ﬁnal analysis, and at the novel’s
conclusion, nothing signiﬁcant has occurred. In keeping with the
historical and temporal arrest with which Deep Blue Sea con-
cluded, the novel is also unable to imagine work and economic
reproduction in a world in which dementia has been cured.
Dementia and utopia in contemporary mass culture: Rise of
the Planet of the Apes
In his essay ‘Reiﬁcation and Utopia in Mass Culture’ (Jameson,
1979), Fredric Jameson outlines a historical materialist approach
to the critical analysis and evaluation of mass cultural texts. In
what remains a highly inﬂuential and important essay, Jameson
rejects the celebratory embrace of mass culture and the self-
consciously anti-elitist stance of some cultural studies scholarship
but also challenges the outright “stigmatisation” (p 130) of the
standardised and ‘pseudo-individual’ products of the ‘culture
industry’ (Horkheimer and Adorno, 2001) at work in the writings
of the Frankfurt School. Instead, he argues that we should view
mass cultural practices such as Hollywood cinema “not as empty
distraction or “mere” false consciousness, but rather as a trans-
formational work on social and political anxieties and fantasies
which must then have some effective presence in the mass cul-
tural text in order subsequently to be managed or repressed” (p
141). He goes on to develop his thesis through a close reading of
two major Hollywood franchises, Spielberg (1975) and The
Godfather parts one and two (1972 and 1974). As my reading of
the debates about ageing, employment, regeneration and futurity
(or the lack of) in Deep Blue Sea and Rainbows End make clear,
such an approach is still important for cultural and social analysis
today. However, Jameson's exploration of these earlier Hollywood
box-ofﬁce record breakers also foregrounds the expression of a
series of “unconscious ideological and utopian impulses” at work
within the ﬁlms (p 147). His essay concludes with a reiteration of
a claim that underpins so much of his writing, namely that:
… all contemporary works of art—whether those of high
culture and modernism or of mass cultural and commercial
culture—have as their underlying impulse—albeit in what
is often distorted and repressed, unconscious form—our
deepest fantasies about the nature of social life, both as we
live it now, and as we feel in our bones it ought rather to be
lived. (p 147)
Jameson’s essay is now nearly forty years old, yet its recogni-
tion of the capacity of a materialist critical practice to illuminate
the ways in which mass and commercial cultural texts serve to
allegorise and express the major ideological tensions and anxieties
with which we live remains compelling. Yet it is with Jameson’s
recognition of the potential of these texts to express utopian or
socially transformative impulses that I want to turn to Rise of the
Planet of the Apes and its very different imaginary resolution to its
representation of an endeavour to cure dementia.
Rise of the Planet of the Apes reproduces many of the same
tropes and conventions as Deep Blue Sea. The research, this time
on captured primates, is driven by the child of a parent with
dementia—in this instance, James Franco’s Will Rodman, an
equally brilliant and driven neuroscientist working for the global
pharmaceutical Gen Sys. The laboratory in which he works is also
“high tech” and overseen by an acquisitive, proﬁt seeking CEO,
Steve Jacobs (David Oyelowo) whose barely concealed brutality
matches that of Samuel L Jackson in Deep Blue Sea as does his
general habitus and selﬁsh interest in personal enrichment. The
science in the ﬁlm is also characteristically rapid. Like the image
of the rapidly ﬁring neurons in Harlin’s ﬁlm and the sudden
restoration of Robert Gu’s cognitive faculties in Rainbows End, in
this ﬁlm the effects of the treatment are instantaneous and
spectacular. Will Rodman is a scientist who runs rather than
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walks down corridors and bursts into rooms rather than com-
municating his ﬁndings by email. The impact of the experimental
drugs he trials is immediate and remarkable; after just one dose of
the ALZ 112 tested on the primates, his father Charles Rodman
(John Lithgow), whose dementia prompts the research, is not
only apparently ‘miraculously’ restored to his former self but
improved and enhanced. The ﬁlm reproduces the popular notion
of the rapidity and suddenness of scientiﬁc discovery (the ‘eureka’
moment) and reinforces a promissory investment in the trans-
formative powers of neuroscientiﬁc research although in this
instance, this research ultimately beneﬁts primates rather than
humans.
On one level, the ﬁlm plays out the same scenario as Deep Blue
Sea in that the experimentation has an ultimately catastrophic
effect on humans. Not only does Will’s father regress and die
having developed antibodies to the ALZ112, but the primate
handler in the research facility Robert Franklin (Tyler Labine) is
exposed to the virus contained in the new variant ALZ113,
develops respiratory problems and rapidly dies, though not before
sneezing all over the Rodman’s unpleasant neighbour. The latter’s
job as a pilot (referred to in the ﬁnal scene) indicates the global
transmission of the deathly virus through transportation links
and serves as a harbinger of the decimation of the human race.
However, in contrast to the depiction of the predatory sharks in
Deep Blue Sea, the ﬁlm demands sympathy for the cognitively
enhanced primates and explains and accounts for instances of
aggression towards their human captors. For instance, the mother
of Caesar, the future leader of the apes, attacks the handler to
protect her baby and Caesar (who is adopted by Rodman fol-
lowing the killing of his mother) attacks Rodman’s neighbour to
protect Charles. This is in marked contrast to the depiction of the
‘super sharks’ as intrinsically and motivelessly malign in Harlin’s
ﬁlm.
It is notable that Wyatt’s ﬁlm foregrounds the continuities
between the incarceration of the primates in the research facility
and the so-called ‘primate sanctuary’ to which Caesar is sent
following his attack on the Rodman’s neighbour. The latter,
overseen by John Landon (Brian Cox) and his cartoonishly cruel
son Dodge (Tom Felton) encapsulates the disjunction between
public face and private reality in the bleak, locked cells that lie
behind the capacious play area of the ‘sanctuary’. Redolent of
images of Abu Ghraib, the dark and dirty cells are places of
torture and brutality in which the primates are physically and
verbally abused by their sadistic captors. This space reproduces
the carceral space of the research facility, the intellectual and
ﬁnancial capital of which is predicated upon the use of primates
as disposable research subjects, conduits for the accumulation of
wealth and prestige on the part of their human captors. The ease
with which Steve Jacobs makes the decision to kill all the captive
chimpanzees following Caesar’s mother’s rampage through the
facility emphasises the systemic violence that characterises the
history of medical research (Lock, 2000, pp 271–272) and the use
of vulnerable and powerless research subjects: not just the body of
primates but the bodies of the poor, of prisoners, of the enslaved,
of racial and religious minorities, and of the disabled.
In drawing attention to the violence that underpins the proﬁt
motives of pharmacological corporations such as Gen Sys, the
narrative thus exposes the asymmetrical power relations and the
inequalities that facilitate the production of medical research, the
development of new treatments, their unequal distribution and
the role of these institutions and practices in reinforcing
inequalities. Signiﬁcantly, it offers a very different denouement to
that of Deep Blue Sea and Rainbows End in the form of the
rebellion of the incarcerated primates led by Caesar. In contrast to
the destruction with which Deep Blue Sea ends or the lack of
transformation in Vinge’s novel, here the inequalities that
separate research subjects from research beneﬁciaries are over-
turned by the collective endeavour of the apes. In marked contrast
to the individualism and self-interest that motivates both Jacobs
and indeed Rodman (whose intent is primarily to treat his father),
the primates work together and are prepared to sacriﬁce them-
selves in order to achieve freedom and a “home” for the collective
in the forest outside the city. In this particular contribution to the
Planet of the Apes franchise, the future lies with communitarian
endeavour and resistance to the brutal logic of capitalist accu-
mulation. Much like the properly utopian notion of transforma-
tion identiﬁed in earlier Hollywood movies by Jameson, the
success of the collective resistance of the apes allegorises the
impossibility of resolving questions of human value, ageing,
resource allocation and futurity in terms of the present neoliberal
parameters of markets and individualisation as represented in
Deep Blue Sea and Rainbows End. In other words, social change
and utopian promise cannot be found within the dominant
ideological and economic paradigms of the present; the neoliberal
version of a future that solves the question of human value and
the crisis of ageing simply isn’t working.
Conclusion: regeneration, futurity and persistence
This essay advances three main arguments. Firstly, that con-
temporary debates about ageing and dementia are increasingly
bound up with the promissory discourses of bio-gerontology and
neuroscientiﬁc epistemologies that facilitate an imaginative
investment in the idea that ageing and age-related conditions
such as dementia might be ‘defeated’. At the heart of these claims
is a model of health and wellbeing that extols the virtues of the
independent, economically active and implicitly able-bodied
person and repudiates physical frailty, dependence and need in
later life. Secondly, I argue that the rhetoric of crisis regarding
ageing and dementia is increasingly bound up with the neoliberal
reduction of human value to economic productivity and the logic
of neoliberal marketization. In relation to the latter, I am referring
to the notion that an investment in biotechnology will yield the
solution to the resources crisis with which dementia presents us
in the shape of lost productivity and the disruption of the ﬂows of
capital. The promise of medical regeneration in this sense cannot
be extricated from the idea of economic regeneration, the latter
being suffused by the notion that eradicating dementia and
defeating ageing will address the resource crisis and economic
abyss with which an ageing population presents us. Thirdly, I
suggest that through an engagement with contemporary popular
literature and ﬁlm and the contradictions and imaginative limits
of their narratives, we can perhaps begin to acknowledge the
ideological limitations of the neoliberal discourses that circum-
scribe the ways in which we currently understand dementia and
our imaginative investments in the promise if its cure.
What is not accounted for in the postulation of global pharma
and the market as the solution to our woes is the intractable
problem of how we might address the needs of an ageing
population living in the chronic mode. The point here is that
despite the apocalyptic narrative that posits dementia as the
greatest threat to humanity, curing dementia will not ‘cure’ ageing
or the fact of our mortality despite the conﬁdence of the sup-
porters of indeﬁnite life extension assembled around ﬁgures such
as Aubrey de Grey. Nor does this narrative of impending resource
crisis (and the aligned idea that curing dementia will address it)
address the economic implications of large populations of people,
displaced by machines and robots, who are not engaged in work
or the production of surplus value. What I hope my reading of the
cultural texts indicates is that neoliberal theoretical and economic
paradigms cannot begin to articulate a response to these pro-
blems, they can only displace or avoid them. Indeed, despite the
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discourse of regeneration and attendant notions of futurity, what
is perhaps interesting to reﬂect upon in conclusion is what is left
or what remains once we become aware of the limitations, con-
tradictions and failures of this promissory vision of cure in both
medical and economic terms. What remains or what persists and
what is often elided or not said are important and profoundly
difﬁcult questions about our attitudes towards ways of dying, the
embodied and affective consequences of impairment and the
possibilities of living well with a chronic or terminal condition. As
my argument regarding the collective and properly transforma-
tive resolution of Rise of the Planet of the Apes makes clear, I
would argue that it is only by imagining very different ways of
living and working and caring for each other that we can begin to
address the implications and possibilities afforded us by the
promise of cure or neural regeneration.
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Notes
1 Examples include the three works I discuss here and novels such Jeffrey Moore’s The
Memory Artists (Moore 2007) or Alexander Jablokov’s short story, ‘living will’ that
explores the notion that our memories might be downloaded (Jablokov 1994).
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